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POLITICAL SPEECH IN THE ARMED FORCES: 
SHOUTING FIRE IN A CROWDED CYBERSPACE? 
ELLIOTT HUGHES* 
“Your voices: for your voices I have fought; 
Watch’d for your voices; for your voices bear 
Of wounds two dozen odd; battles thrice six 
I have seen, and heard of; for your voices have 
Done many things, some less, some more: your voices: 
Indeed, I would be consul.”1 
 
Caius Martius Coriolanus 
 
ABSTRACT 
A staple of the American version of democracy is civilian control of the 
military: we are uncomfortable with politicization of the Armed Forces, 
and military and other federal laws restrict the political expression of 
servicemembers (“SMs”) in the Armed Forces, whether they are active-
duty members or National Guard or Reserves serving on active duty.2 
These restrictions, while well-intentioned to prevent actual or apparent 
political partisanship or bias within the military, have the undesired effect 
of deterring SMs from otherwise healthy political expression. With the 
advent of the internet and proliferation of social media use, questions 
regarding SM status and identification with the military complicate the 
political participation of citizen-soldiers. The presence of over-reaching 
restrictions on political expression and lack of clear guidance dictating 
what political expression SMs can and cannot make in online forums have 
several effects. First, this framework of acceptable political discourse 
contributes to a breakdown of the ‘citizen-soldier’ ideal that is peculiar to 
the American conception of military service in a democracy. Second, this 
framework tends to deprive SMs of their personal and political autonomy 
in a manner that tends to reduce them to a position of vassalage. Third, 
this reinforces the ‘tyranny of majority opinion’ that John Stuart Mill 
presciently warned of at a time when militaries were professionalizing.3 
                                                      
         *  J.D. candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2019; B.S. Arabic, United 
States Military Academy Class of 2012; Captain, United States Army. The views expressed herein do 
not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the United States Government. 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF CORIOLANUS, act 2, sc. 3, lines 126–31. 
 2. The Department of Defense has strict rules that define and distinguish between “partisan 
political activity and “nonpartisan political activity.” See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF. DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1344.10], 
available at http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/134410p.pdf.  
 3. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) 
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Lastly, this framework contributes to the isolation of the military from 
general society by removing military voices from the ‘marketplace of 
ideas,’ thereby depriving the public discourse of a crucial segment of the 
American population. While partisan political expression in online forums 
is a relatively new phenomenon, it is merely an extension of every citizen’s 
right to engage in public debate, and to the extent that SMs are prohibited 
or deterred from political expression through legal restrictions rather than 
professional and ethical norms, their right to exercise the duties of 
citizenship is infringed, to their detriment and that of the body politic. 
INTRODUCTION  
The tradition of civilian control over the military has long been a 
permanent fixture of American society. Although today all smart generals 
know that civilian leaders are the final decision-makers, this outcome was 
not clear from the beginning. When the “Newburgh Conspiracy” erupted 
at the time the American Revolution was drawing to a close, mutinous 
sentiment pervaded the underpaid officer corps in the Continental Army, 
and several members advocated a takeover of the Continental Congress 
that had failed to pay them for their service.4 George Washington found it 
necessary to intervene and convinced the disquieted officers that they must 
have faith in Congress and pledge allegiance to their elected leaders.5 The 
societal norm of civilian control over military affairs has thereafter been 
steadily reinforced since the early days of the American republic when the 
extent of governmental control of military affairs was not yet settled.6 This 
                                                                                                                           
(1859). 
 4. Even though General Cornwallis had surrendered at Yorktown in October 1781, there was 
much to be done to secure the fledgling American state because British troops remained in New York. 
The issue of back pay and pensions for continental troops led some officers to pen anonymous letters 
calling for a meeting to address their grievances, and to either disengage from British troops and march 
out west to ‘mock’ the Congress, or to march on Philadelphia and seize control of the government. 
Washington, when he received word of the letters, addressed the gathering of 500 officers and 
persuaded them to condemn the letters and pledge their faith to Congress. For the fuller story of the 
events of the Newburgh Conspiracy, see Francis P. Sempa, The Newburgh Conspiracy,  
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/sempa_newburgh.html (last visited Sept. 
20, 2018).  
 5. On March 15, 1783 when Washington addressed the officers, he commended their bravery, 
appealed to their patriotism, promised to persuade Congress to meet their just demands, and pleaded 
with them to refrain from opening “the flood gates of civil discord” and deluging “our rising empire in 
blood.” Do not take any action, he said, that “will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have 
hitherto maintained.” Id. 
 6. Although the extent of civilian control over the military was not definitively settled when the 
American Revolution concluded, as former Chief Justice Warren noted in his 1962 speech at the New 
York University Law Center, the dangers posed by military usurpation were “uppermost in the minds 
of the Founding Fathers when they drafted the Constitution, and distrust of a standing army was 
expressed by many. Recognition of the danger from Indians and foreign nations caused them to 
authorize a national armed force begrudgingly." Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 183 (1962). Additionally, the Chief Justice referred to such a practice in the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/9
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paper seeks to explore this long-standing practice and the restrictions that 
have been placed upon SM political expression. I will begin with a brief 
overview of speech and political expressions within the American military 
from the 1950’s onward, beginning with the watershed moment when the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice came into effect, displacing the 
divergent codes and enforcement mechanisms used by the different 
military branches to maintain good order and discipline. Next, I will cover 
the responses from Congress and military leadership to the political speech 
and activities of SMs, including traditional forms of political expression 
but focusing on political expression in online forums and social media. 
Useful comparisons will be made to recent jurisprudence regarding 
civilian employee speech, especially with respect to questions about 
employee status and official duty speech. After covering these areas, I will 
focus on the larger philosophical implications of restrictions on SM 
expression, both for the individual autonomy of citizen-soldiers and for the 
marketplace of ideas that requires input from all corners of society to 
function effectively. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN MILITARY SPEECH 
The dynamics of the Roman army of Coriolanus’ era are not so 
different from the American military that we are familiar with in our 
modern age.7 Shortly before Coriolanus’ time, Rome had transformed 
from a monarchy into a republic and the leadership of the country rested 
upon two consuls with the power to nullify the other’s decision.8 The 
tension between the military and civilian leadership of Rome was 
exemplified by Coriolanus’ own transformation from military hero to 
aspiring consul. This same tension is overtly felt in American society 
when former generals run for political office or excessively populate the 
executive cabinet.9 Roman senators and the common plebs feared that 
                                                                                                                           
United States and Canada by noting that “[b]oth nations have a long tradition based upon Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence which has consistently subordinated the military to the civilian in Government.” Id. 
 7. Although separated by millennia, the social dynamics of Rome’s professional army is now 
mirrored in some respects by the all-volunteer force that now exists in America since the end of the 
draft in 1973. With the end of conscription, officers and even enlisted soldiers increasingly see 
themselves as members of the ‘profession of arms.’ Such a professional ethos has become 
commonplace, particularly within the United States Army, amongst military doctrine and training 
regimens. The Army attempted to capture this outlook in U.S. ARMY, The Profession of Arms, 
https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/profession_of_arms_white_paper_Dec2010.p
df (Dec. 8, 2010). 
 8. GARY FORSYTHE, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF EARLY ROME: FROM PREHISTORY TO THE FIRST 
PUNIC WAR, (2006). 
 9. The concern over senior military officials holding high political offices is present in the 
current American administration. See Phillip Carter & Loren DeJonge Schulman, Trump Is 
Surrounding Himself with Generals. That’s Dangerous, WASH. POST, (Nov. 30, 2016) 
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Coriolanus would too harshly dismiss the concerns of the people whose 
basic needs were not being met, and that due to his martial nature, 
Coriolanus was not fit to govern in a complex society.10 Similar fears as to 
the extent of military influence over the political process have animated 
the actions of military reformers and the U.S. Congress to legally limit the 
political expression which members of the American military may 
undertake without repercussions.11 To that end, Congress and the 
Department of Defense have enacted administrative regulations that codify 
legal restrictions on SM speech.12 
Prior to the enactment of the first version of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) in 1950, each of the different branches of 
service had their own penal code that was enforced to maintain order and 
discipline.13 Although the unification of the military’s penal code 
presented an opportunity for military law to expressly prohibit political 
expression, the restrictions on expression within the UCMJ were, and 
continue to be, limited to insubordinate speech and other speech that 
works to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces, 
without any explicit reference to political expression.14 The case law 
surrounding military speech law remains relatively sparse, perhaps exactly  
  
                                                                                                                           
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-surrounding-himself-with-generals-thats-
dangerous/2016/11/30/e6a0a972-b190-11e6-840f-
e3ebab6bcdd3_story.html?utm_term=.97be94fcf9e5. The author would like to emphasize that no 
political stance is taken in this paper with regards to appointments made by the current administration. 
It can be argued that the relatively recent phenomenon of multiple military officers populating the 
Executive Cabinet can be traced in part to the advent of America’s first professional military to be 
maintained in peacetime, a situation that obtained in the mid-1990’s following the end of the Cold 
War. 
 10. Frank Kermode, Commentary on Coriolanus, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1442 (G. 
Blakemore Evans et al. eds., 1997). 
 11. American history contains many successful generals-turned-politicians: George Washington, 
Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and in our modern time, Dwight 
Eisenhower have all exemplified this trend. See Steve Corbett & Michael Davidson, The Role of the 
Military in Presidential Politics, PARAMETERS (Winter 2009-10). But not all generals have met with 
political success. In the 1852 presidential election, General Winfield Scott was unable to parlay his 
successful military career into presidential success. Id. More recently, General Wesley Clark ran 
unsuccessfully for president in the 2004 presidential election. Clark Withdrawal, C-SPAN (Feb. 11, 
2004), https://www.c-span.org/video/?180544-1/clark-withdrawal. During the election of 1832 when 
Sylvanus Thayer was the Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, he attempted to “inculcate 
political neutrality among cadets” and sought to severely reprimand a cadet for placing a hickory pole 
on the parade field in support of Andrew Jackson for the 1832 election. An amused President Jackson 
later reversed Thayer’s decision. Id. at 60. 
 12. See DOD DIR. 1344.10, supra note 2. 
 13. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/UCMJ_1950.html, (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 14. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) art. 134 (1950).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/9
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because no penal article of the UCMJ directly penalizes speech itself 
outside of disrespectful speech made directly to the president, vice 
president, members of Congress and other senior officials, and 
insubordination to superior commissioned officers.15  
Written restrictions on SM political expression are a product of very 
recent history, although several Supreme Court rulings have affirmed the 
ability of military leaders to restrict the ability of their subordinate 
personnel and civilians from engaging in certain kinds of partisan political 
activities. Restrictions on various kinds of SM speech, including political 
speech, find legitimacy in the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Levy, 
which declared that “This Court has long recognized that the military is, 
by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have 
also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws 
and traditions of its own during its long history.”16 The differences 
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that “it 
is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight 
wars should the occasion arise.”17 
 Levy featured an Army doctor who refused to train Special Forces 
soldiers that were preparing to deploy to Vietnam, and while it did not 
explicitly deal with matters of political expression (although resistance to 
the war in Vietnam was a hotly-contested political issue), as Justice 
Douglas noted, Levy was “the first case that presents to us a question of 
what protection, if any, the First Amendment gives people in the Armed 
Services.”18 The limits on political activity do not apply once citizens have 
left active or reserve military service, and retired generals and admirals 
have played increasingly common roles in advocating for partisan political 
candidates since 1992 when retired Marine General Paul Kelley endorsed 
George H.W. Bush for president, followed by an endorsement for Bill 
Clinton from retired Admiral William Crowe.19 
The current professional ethic regarding political abstention is 
generally traceable to the post-Civil War era.20 In our modern age, the 
                                                      
 15. See infra notes 21 and 22 for the articles of the UCMJ that are used to prosecute speech that 
is prejudicial to good order and discipline in the Armed Forces. 
 16. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). 
 17. Id. (citation omitted). 
 18. Id. at 768. 
 19. See David Evans, Crowe Endorsement of Clinton Raises More Than Eyebrows, CHI. TRIB. 
(Sept. 25, 1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-09-25/news/9203270346_1_crowe-iranian-
territorial-waters-clinton-campaign. Other prominent instances of retired SMs playing outsized roles in 
political advocacy include the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth group that levied criticisms of then-
presidential candidate John Kerry in 2004. See Jodi Wilgoren, Veterans Group Criticizes Kerry on His 
Record in Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/us/veterans-group-citizens-kerry-on-his-record-in-vietnam.html. 
 20. While he was in command of the Army for fourteen years following the Civil War, General 
William Tecumseh Sherman was adamant about keeping the military out of partisan politics. The 
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professional ethic of nonpartisanship has been further refined over time, 
but there is an added layer of legal compulsion since all members of the 
Armed Forces are governed by the UCMJ. The UCMJ is purely punitive 
and punishes different types of SM speech.21 The UCMJ does not 
explicitly prohibit SMs from making political endorsements or other 
political expressions; rather, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and its 
subordinate branches issue regulations that control SM political 
expression, and when these regulations are violated, punishment attaches 
through violations of UCMJ articles that require compliance with lawful 
military orders.22 Therefore, in order to punish an SM for making a 
                                                                                                                           
Army “discourage[d] officers from taking an interest in politics,” and Sherman disliked Washington, 
D.C. politics to such an extent that he decided to relocate his command center and staff to St. Louis, 
Missouri for two years to be away from political influence. See Corbett & Davidson, supra note 11, at 
60. 
 21. For example, Article 89: Disrespect towards superior commissioned officer (CO), “[a]ny 
person subject to this chapter who behaves with disrespect toward his superior commissioned officer 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” UCMJ art. 89 (2016). Article 91: Disrespect towards 
superior commissioned officer:  
Any warrant officer or enlisted member who (1) strikes or assaults a warrant officer, 
noncommissioned officer, or petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his office; 
(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty 
officer; or (3) treats with contempt or is disrespectful in language or deportment toward a 
warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer while that officer is in the 
execution of his office; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  
UCMJ art. 91.  
  Article 117: Provoking speech or gestures, “[a]ny person subject to this chapter who causes 
or participates in any riot or breach of the peace shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” 
UCMJ art. 117. Article 133: Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman, “[a]ny commissioned 
officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” UCMJ art. 133. Article 134: General article: 
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice 
of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit 
upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this 
chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance by a general, special, or summary court-
martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the 
discretion of that court. 
UCMJ art. 134. Article 134 is a ‘catch-all’ used to punish disruptive unenumerated behavior that is 
prejudicial to good order and discipline. Id. 
 22. The prohibitions on political endorsement concern situations when SMs are in uniform or 
when their actions could imply official sponsorship. This also extends to situations in which they can 
be reasonably identified on their social media page as a member of the military, although in the latter 
case DOD Directive 1344.10 only requires that a disclaimer in the endorsement be included if the 
person can be reasonably identified as a member of the military, whereas the latter activity is 
completely proscribed. For cases of improper political speech that the military wishes to prosecute, it 
must do a roundabout prosecution that normally utilizes the following three articles. Article 90: 
Assaulting of willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer: 
Any person subject to this chapter who—(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or 
draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence against him while he is in the execution 
of his office; or (2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned 
officer; shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at any other time, 
by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.  
UCMJ art. 90. For Article 91, see supra note 21. Article 92: Failure to obey order or regulation:  
[a]ny person subject to this chapter who—(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/9
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personal endorsement while in uniform at a candidate’s rally, as Specialist 
Jesse Thorsen did in 2012 at a Ron Paul rally, military prosecutors are 
only able to make a case that an SM violated regulations.23 
Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 contains the current slate of 
regulations that govern partisan political conduct by SMs.24 The purpose 
of the directive is to govern and restrict the extent to which members of 
the Armed Forces can participate in partisan politics, and its applicability 
extends to members of state National Guard units even when they are not 
on federal status.25 Because of the importance of maintaining a politically 
neutral military that does not officially sanction one partisan faction over 
the other, and the imperative that citizens exercise their right to political 
speech to the greatest extent possible, Directive 1344.10 encourages 
"members of the Armed Forces . . . to carry out the obligations of 
citizenship" if such participation is in "keeping with the traditional concept 
that members on active duty should not engage in partisan political 
activity, and that members not on active duty should avoid inferences that 
their political activities imply or appear to imply official sponsorship, 
approval, or endorsement."26  
Alongside this encouragement to participate in condoned  political 
activities,27 there is an extensive set of restrictions on SM political activity. 
A primary issue with these regulations is their vagueness when applied to 
online political expression, because restrictions on traditional political 
                                                                                                                           
order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of 
the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3) is derelict in the 
performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  
UCMJ art. 92. 
 23. For his violations of existing regulations against politicking in uniform, Specialist Thorsen, a 
member of the Army Reserve, received a letter of reprimand in lieu of formal legal prosecution. See 
Leo Shane III, Army Reservist Who Endorsed Ron Paul Receives Reprimand, STARS AND STRIPES 
(Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.stripes.com/army-reservist-who-endorsed-ron-paul-receives-reprimand-
1.173096. 
 24. See DOD DIR. 1344.10, supra note 2. 
 25. Directive 1344.10, § 2 states that the directive has a broad application covering: 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard 
at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by 
agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the 
Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the 
Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”). 
Paragraph 4.3. applies to members of the National Guard, even when in a non-Federal status. 
Other provisions apply to members of the National Guard while on active duty, which, for 
purposes of this Directive only, also includes full-time National Guard duty. 
DOD DIR. 1344.10, supra note 2, para. 2.  
 26. DOD DIR. 1344.10, supra note 2, para. 4. 
 27. For instance, SMs are free to vote, write letters to the editor, and give money to candidates 
under certain circumstances, along with other expressions of political activity, so long as such actions 
cannot be perceived as representing the service in an official capacity. 
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expression are not so easily translated into the online realm.28 This leaves 
the military in a lurch, an especially dangerous one since criminal 
sanctions apply to violations of these restrictions. Political advocacy and 
other forms of political expression are frowned upon by segments of the 
military, but the ‘citizen-soldier’ ideal is more than just a vestige of an 
earlier time.29 The nebulous guidelines governing SM expression online 
chills their political participation, especially at a time when social media 
use in the military is growing and is often the only platform SMs have to 
communicate with the outside world. This further isolates the military 
from the population at large, which ultimately undermines the health of a 
democracy that depends on an all-volunteer fighting force. 
The applicable test of whether or not speech made by military SMs 
falls outside constitutional protection is essentially the same test that is 
used for curtailment of civilian speech, namely, the “clear and present 
danger” test established in Schenck v. United States.30 It was not clear 
exactly what kinds of political speech within the military could be 
constitutionally curtailed until 1967 when the Court of Military Appeals 
applied the “clear and present danger” test that was formulated in Schenck 
to an officer who was protesting the Vietnam War.31 In United States v. 
Howe, an off-duty Second Lieutenant attended an anti-war rally outside of 
Ft. Bliss, Texas in which he marched and held a sign stating “Let's have 
more than a choice between petty ignorant facists [sic] in 1968" on one 
side, and "End Johnson's facist [sic] aggression in Viet Nam" on the 
other.32 Especially important to this decision was the fact that in Howe, the 
                                                      
 28. SMs can display political bumper stickers on their privately-owned vehicles, DOD DIR. 
1344.10, supra note 11, para. 4.1.1.8, but they are not allowed to display a large political sign, banner, 
or poster, id. para. 4.1.2.11. This leaves us with the conundrum of whether there is any appreciable 
difference between a Facebook ‘profile photo’ and ‘cover photo,’ one being smaller than the other. 
29.   See generally Kevin Toner, Officers Should Not Vote (2015) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Command and General Staff College Foundation), available at 
http://www.cgscfoundation.org/events/ethics-symposium/2015-ethics-symposium-archive/; M.L. 
Cavanaugh, I Fight for Your Right to Vote. But I Won’t Do It Myself, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016); 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/opinion/i-fight-for-your-right-to-vote-but-i-wont-do-it-
myself.html; Ronald Krebs, The Citizen-Soldier Tradition in the United States: Has Its Demise Been 
Greatly Exaggerated?, 36 ARMED FORCES & SOC. 153– 74 (2009). 
 30. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The underlying rationale for the clear and 
present danger test is that the speech must present such a threat that immediate legal intervention is 
necessary. In the context of the Armed Forces, such politically-oriented speech that is prejudicial to 
good order and discipline can be said to present such an immediate danger of insubordination and 
chaos amongst military ranks to be subject to legal intervention. 
 31. The Court of Military Appeals was the predecessor of the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces (“C.A.A.F.”). The CAAF is essentially the Supreme Court of the military justice system that 
presides over legal matters that rise through each of the different service branches, and their decisions 
are directly reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court. Up until 1953, the Supreme Court largely 
abstained from intervening in the affairs of military courts martial. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 
(1 Wall.) 243, 251–52 (1864); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82–83 (1857). In 1953, habeas 
corpus review of courts martial was established in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Id. at 142. 
 32. United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429, 432 (1967). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/9
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officer in question was off-duty and not in military uniform, but was 
identified as an SM by a nearby military policeman.33 There was no 
question that had Lieutenant Howe been a civilian, his speech would have 
been fully protected because it was political expression that did not carry 
with it the threat of physical violence or use of imminent force. In fact, the 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a civilian in Watts v. United 
States where a man at a political rally declared, “If they ever make me 
carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” because the 
Court viewed this speech as political hyperbole.34 But the military court 
overseeing Howe’s case ultimately concluded that the freedom of speech 
may be permissibly curtailed in situations where such speech from SMs 
presents a clear and present danger to the discipline of the Armed Forces.35 
The same analysis in Howe can be easily transferred to the realm of 
internet speech. The remaining question is how much is required before an 
SM can be “reasonably identified” as a member of the military?36 The 
absence of clearly established guidelines deters members of the military 
from actively participating in substantive political discussions in online 
forums, although there is a proliferation of politically-oriented social 
                                                      
 33. Id. at 443. While the Court considered it important that Lieutenant Howe could be identified 
as a member of the Armed Forces, this factor is not necessarily an ‘element’ which the prosecution had 
to prove to convict him under the UCMJ. Rather, this factor played into the Court’s analysis of 
whether 2LT Howe had broken the regulations which curtailed his ability to politically protest. The 
Court cited Army Regulation 600–20 (Army Command Policy). Although the location of the cited 
section and its wording have changed, the substance is still currently in effect: 
Participation in picket lines or any other public demonstrations, including those pertaining to 
civil rights, may imply Army sanction of the cause for which the demonstration is conducted. 
Such participation by members of the Army, not sanctioned by competent authority, is 
prohibited: 
  a. During the hours they are required to be present for duty. 
  b. When they are in uniform. 
  c. When they are on a military reservation. 
  d. When they are in a foreign country. 
  e. When their activities constitute a breach of law and order. 
  f. When violence is reasonably likely to result. 
Id. at 440 n.15.  
 34. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). 
 35. In taking judicial notice of the environment into which Lieutenant Howe decided to throw 
himself, the Court of Military Appeals wrote: 
We do judicially know that hundreds of thousands of members of our military forces are 
committed to combat in Vietnam, casualties among our forces are heavy, and thousands are 
being recruited, or drafted, into our armed forces. That in the present times and circumstances 
such conduct by an officer constitutes a clear and present danger to discipline within our 
armed services, under the precedents established by the Supreme Court, seems to require no 
argument. 
Howe, 37 C.M.R. at 437–38. This logic of expanded governmental powers to curtail speech during 
wartime is traceable to the logic that the Supreme Court applied in Schenck. 
 36. The court in Howe did not explicitly outline the standard for that would make a citizen 
reasonably identifiable as a member of the Armed Forces. Today, the prevalence of photo-heavy social 
media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook make it likely photographs of SMs in uniform will 
likely suffice when making this determination, though the standard is yet unclear. 
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media focused on military and veterans’ issues.37 This is not to say that 
SMs do not know that there are certain lines they cannot cross; for 
instance, denigrating their superior officers or the commander-in-chief in 
an online forum. In a recent example demonstrating the Howe analysis in 
the context of the internet, Marine Sergeant Gary Stein learned the hard 
way that SM political expression in online forums can provide the basis 
for punishment through a court-martial.38 There is an important rationale 
for providing criminal and administrative punishments for SMs that act in 
open defiance of military and civilian leaders.39 However, the largely 
untested waters of partisan political expression in online forums, an 
activity that is merely an extension of every citizen’s right to advocate for 
their preferred elected leader, means that SMs cannot be sure to what 
extent they are allowed to advocate for or criticize candidates for public 
office, or critique their actions and policies while actually in office. 
II. RESPONSES FROM MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP 
As a response to the increasing relevance of online speech, the different 
branches of the service have issued various pronouncements that attempt 
to clarify what is deemed to be acceptable online speech and behavior and 
what falls outside of condoned conduct. Perhaps most importantly, in 
2008, the DoD issued updated guidance that outlined acceptable online 
expression in very broad terms but did not actually contain any concrete 
examples or specific illustrations of what can be considered as worry-free 
expression that SMs can make online.40 What appears to have happened 
with this issuance of additional guidance is that a new regime of 
regulations has been laid on top of the UCMJ, a code that does not exactly 
contain the clarity necessary to punish inappropriate online speech, and in 
doing so has only served to further confuse what is already a patchwork of 
regulations across the different branches and a messy interaction with the 
penal code.41  
                                                      
 37. For instance, the Armed Forces Tea Party is a group on Facebook and an independent 
website that provides military SMs with the chance to connect with members of the Tea Party 
movement. See Armed Forces Tea Party, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/ArmedForcesTeaParty/about/?ref=page_internal (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
38. Brian Rooney, Sgt. Gary Stein, Discharged for Obama Criticism, "Scared," Not Backing 
Down, CBS NEWS (May 4, 2012, 10:11 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sgt-gary-stein-
discharged-for-obama-criticism-scared-not-backing-down/. 
 39. Sgt. Gary Stein declared that "[a]s an active-duty Marine, I say, ‘Screw Obama,’ and I will 
not follow the orders from him - all orders from him." He also said he would “not salute President 
Obama,” that “he's the economic enemy, the religious enemy, also, a domestic enemy.” Id. 
 40. See DOD DIR. 1344.10, supra note 25. 
 41. See Michelle Borgnino, Mutiny on the High C: How the Armed Forces Regulate and 
Criminalize Servicemember Speech Online, 224 MIL. L. REV. 800 (2016) (arguing that DOD Directive 
1344.10 further complicates an already convoluted system of prosecuting unacceptable online speech 
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Exemplifying the problem of this ‘patchwork’ approach to regulating 
online speech, the Army published a branch-specific directive regarding 
how SMs should conduct their speech online in All Army Activities 
message ALARACT 122/2015.42 One of the primary issues with this 
publication is that it does not actually address political speech made online 
by members of the Army. The focus of the publication is to clarify 
standards of online behavior in light of the Army’s continued fight against 
sexual harassment and sexual assault within its ranks and unfortunately it 
does nothing to further refine what constitutes acceptable online 
behavior.43 To this day, the publications from the different branches of 
service detailing what is and is not acceptable online behavior mostly 
provide guidance for the official social media accounts that are maintained 
by members of different military commands and their public relations 
officers.44  
III. COMPARISONS TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
A comparison of SM speech to civilian employee speech is beneficial. 
Employers reasonably desire to control their employees’ speech to the 
extent that this control safeguards their business interests, and this desire 
affects several different aspects of employment. As an employer, the 
federal government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its employees 
are discharging their duties, and when employee speech on a matter not of 
public concern interferes with productivity then it can be constitutionally 
curtailed.45 The most direct civilian comparison to restrictions on military 
speech is The Hatch Act of 1939.46 The Hatch Act was designed to 
maintain neutrality amongst the federal workforce and some state and 
                                                                                                                           
and that the UCMJ should be internally modified so improper online speech can be directly 
prosecuted). 
 42. C. Todd Lopez, For Those Still Unsure, Army Defines ‘Online Misconduct,’ TRADOC NEWS 
CENTER (Aug. 4, 2015), http://tradocnews.org/for-those-still-unsure-army-defines-online-misconduct/. 
 43. In addition to the ALARACT’s focus on sexual assault and harassment, the message focuses 
on online bullying and other forms of hazing. This is part of the larger effort by the Army to maintain 
professional standards and a team-oriented climate that does not condone online misconduct. 
Unfortunately, noticeably absent from the Army’s attempt to sharpen its definition of misconduct is an 
updated guidance on what constitutes acceptable partisan political behavior. 
 44. See Army Social Media, ARMY.MIL, http://www.army.mil/media/socialmedia/ (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2018); Navy Social Media, NAVY.MIL, http://www.navy.mil/CommandDirectory.asp?id=0  
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018); Airforce Social Media, AF.MIL, 
http://www.af.mil/afsites/socialmediasites.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2018); Marine Corps Social 
Media, MARINES.MIL, http://www.marines.mil/News/SocialMedia.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2018). 
 45. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–57 (1983); see also Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 720 (Md. 1992). 
 46. The Hatch Act of 1939 was preceded by the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 in 
which Congress began to curtail the political activities of federal, and some state and local employees. 
See An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (“Hatch Act”), 5 U.S.C. § 7234 (2012); 
Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (amended 1978).  
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local officials who receive federal funds and might be tempted to use their 
position for partisan advocacy. It has so far survived all constitutional 
challenges.47 After several attempts at piecemeal reform of the Hatch Act, 
Congress passed the Hatch Act Modernization Act in 2012 to ease the 
restrictions on federal workers. However, the Act still prohibits the use of 
“official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or 
affecting the result of an election," "knowingly solicit[ing], accept[ing], or 
receiv[ing] a political contribution," from certain persons, "run[ning] for 
the nomination or as a candidate for election to a partisan political office," 
or "solicit[ing] or discourag[ing] the participation in political activity of," 
certain persons.48 It should be noted that in the military context, attempts 
by high-ranking officers to deliver the votes of their subordinates to 
candidates for public office is not unheard-of, and the two Hatch Acts 
have been geared toward discouraging such attempts to swing civilian 
government employees in a partisan direction.49 
Alongside concerns regarding employee efficiency at work, and the 
potential for political speech to interfere with employee efficiency, 
employers are also concerned with the public’s perception of their 
business and how the speech of their employees impacts that perception. 
The public perception of the military as an apolitical organization is 
potentially the most important reason that the government can offer to 
restrict the political speech of SMs other than the efficiency with which 
they perform their jobs and any potential interference their political 
advocacy might have with their work.  
One of the primary dividing lines when classifying speech for First 
Amendment purposes in the employment context is that between 
performance-based and expression-based speech. Most political speech 
from SMs is considered expressive speech, while voting and political rally 
attendance are considered speech through performance.50 Within the 
                                                      
 47. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) 
(holding that the Hatch Act does not prohibit government employee speech on political affairs but only 
prohibits employees from participating as partisan candidates, which is not a fundamental right). See 
also Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (holding that the Hatch Act does not 
violate the Tenth Amendment and the U.S. Civil Service Commission had authority to order 
withholding of federal highway funds if Oklahoma did not fire state government employee who was 
also chairman of partisan political party). 
 48. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (“Hatch Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-230, 126 
Stat. 1616 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. 
 49. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 842 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that in 1864, some 
Union officers had “sought to exercise undue influence either for President Lincoln or for his 
opponent, General McClellan, in the election of 1864.” Id. at 842.  
 50. The right to association is essentially a performance-based form of speech, and courts have 
held that employees’ off-duty speech that interferes with their ability to perform their employment 
duties is subject to curtailment. See Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a corrections officer’s association with a motorcycle club with a long history of criminal 
activity undermined the correctional officer’s ability to perform his or her work in prison because of 
the presence of club members and rival club members in the prison). 
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military, Article 134 potentially encompasses both parts of this functional 
divide by prohibiting all misconduct, including speech, that operates “to 
the prejudice of good order and discipline” within the Armed Forces.51 
In United States v. Wilcox, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(“C.A.A.F.”) recently held that uttering racist statements and holding 
beliefs regarding racial inequality is not enough to establish criminal 
liability under Article 134 of the UCMJ, although it might run afoul of 
stated Department of Defense policy.52 The Court stressed that in order for 
a legally sufficient charge under Article 134 to result in a conviction, the 
speech or conduct must have a “reasonably direct and palpable effect on 
the military mission or military environment.”53 The Court further stressed 
that it must be likely, rather than a mere possibility, that someone from the 
general public would view the SM’s statements and attribute them to the 
military.54  
In the context of expressive political speech, the C.A.A.F. and the 
Supreme Court have here presented contradictory views of what kind of 
speech constitutes a “clear and present danger” that operates to the 
prejudice of “good order and discipline” in the Armed Forces. In United 
States v. Howe, the C.A.A.F. upheld the conviction of an Army lieutenant 
for his political speech even though he was a reserve officer, rather than a 
professional officer, because “during the time he serve[d] on active duty 
he [was] . . . controlled by the provisions of military law” and although 
here the “military restrictions [fell] upon a reluctant ‘summer soldier . . . at 
another time, and differing circumstances, the ancient and wise provisions 
insuring civilian control of the military will restrict the ‘man on a white 
horse.’"55 The rationale of preventing the future ‘man on a white horse’ 
seems to stand in direct contradiction to the previously-adhered to 
standard that speech can only be singled out for legal suppression if it 
presents a clear and present danger, as formulated by the Schenck decision.  
Regardless of the potential impact upon service readiness, a great deal 
                                                      
 51. For the full text of Article 134 see supra note 21. Article 134 has been described as a ‘catch-
all’ that covers conduct which would otherwise go unpunished but is detrimental to order and 
discipline in the military.  
 52. “Appellant's online profiles show that Appellant held beliefs that are both disturbing and 
inconsistent with Department of Defense policies regarding racial equality and other matters, that 
alone is insufficient under the facts of this case to impose criminal sanctions under Article 134, 
UCMJ.” United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2008).   
 53. Id. at 450. 
 54. The court held: 
The mere possibility, assumed by the CCA and unsupported by the record, that a 
Servicemember or member of the public might stumble Appellant’s expression of his beliefs, 
believe he was in the military, and attribute his views to the military is so tenuous and 
speculative as to be legally insufficient to support . . . the charged violation of Article 134. 
Id. at 451. 
 55. United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429, 439 (1967). 
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of SM expression has been categorically subjected to government control 
by the controversial Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.56 In 
Garcetti, the Court held that “[w]hen public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”57  
In many ways, the Garcetti decision can be viewed as merely an 
extension of the earlier Supreme Court ruling in Pickering v. Board of 
Education which established the Pickering balancing test to determine 
whether or not public employee speech is protected by the First 
Amendment.58 The problem with the holding in Garcetti is that even if an 
issue falls within those disputes that are part of a broader public debate, if 
the employee’s speech on the issue is made pursuant to the employee’s 
official duties, then that speech can be constitutionally restrained by the 
employee’s supervisors. In this case, whatever expression an SM makes as 
part of their official military duties is subject to regulation and restriction 
by their supervisors within the DOD. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer 
dissented along divergent rationales, disagreeing with each other in 
addition to disagreeing with the majority. But all dissenting justices agreed 
that a categorical withdrawal of First Amendment protection for public 
employees speaking pursuant to their official duties is not the correct 
approach.59 
The same concerns that the dissent in Garcetti expressed about a per se 
rule which removes First Amendment protections from official duty 
speech are present in the military context. But in their Garcetti dissents, 
Justices Souter and Breyer did not raise concerns at the prospect of SM 
speech being curtailed; rather, they would have further tipped the scale in 
the employer’s favor in cases involving government employees. Justice 
Souter would have held that “private and public interest in addressing 
official wrongdoing and threats to health and safety can outweigh the 
government’s stake in the efficient implementation of policy,” so that even 
if employee speech occurs “in the course of their duties,” they should have 
                                                      
 56. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) 
57.   Id. at 421. For further discussion on the discord over the Garcetti decision, see, e.g., Martha 
McCarthy & Suzanne Eckes, Silence in The Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public 
School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209 (2008); Jessica Reed, From Pickering to Ceballos: The 
Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95 (2007); Elizabeth 
Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 174 (2008).   
 58. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The problem in any case is to arrive at 
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees.”).  
 59. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426–50. 
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First Amendment protection.60 However, he would have applied a 
modified Pickering standard to every case of public employee speech, and 
would have the government prevail unless the employee (1) spoke on a 
matter of unusual importance, and (2) satisfied high standards of 
responsibility in the way that they spoke.61 Justice Breyer agreed with this 
modified approach, but remained concerned that there are “far too many 
issues of public concern, even if defined as ‘matters of unusual 
importance,’” for Justice Souter’s test to effectively safeguard the 
legitimate administrative and efficiency needs of public employers.62 This 
is because, in his view, matters of unusual importance “are often daily 
bread-and-butter concerns for the police, the intelligence agencies, the 
military, and many whose jobs involve protecting the public’s health, 
safety, and the environment.”63 
Members of the military are uniquely suited to comment upon military 
affairs, an area of America’s political discourse that is usually the subject 
of contentious debate. Owing to their unique (and when compared to the 
general population, miniscule) position in American society,64 members of 
the military are perhaps best suited to discuss the use of the American 
military in an informed and educated manner. Nevertheless, the 
disentanglement of their military and civilian roles can prove especially 
problematic, since it is difficult to determine exactly where the official SM 
duties end and their speech as a private citizen begins. Once an SM enters 
active duty, they endure a permanent change of status and it is not clear 
exactly when they cease being soldiers for military purposes and don their 
civilian hats:  
Enlistment is a contract; but it is one of those contracts which 
changes the status . . . . By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. 
His relations to the state and the public are changed. He acquires a 
new status, with correlative rights and duties; and although he may 
violate his contract obligations, his status as a soldier is unchanged. 
He cannot of his own volition throw off the garments he has once 
put on, nor can he, the state not objecting, renounce his relations 
and destroy his status. . . .65 
The issue of when to consider SM speech as “official duty speech” 
under Garcetti is not simply limited to the problem of their permanent 
                                                      
 60. Id. at 429. 
 61. Id. at 435. 
 62. Id. at 448. 
 63. Id.  
 64. George Reynolds & Amanda Shendruk, Demographics of the U.S. Military, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/article/demographics-us-military. 
65.   In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 152 (1890). 
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status as a military member, whether in an active duty or reserve capacity, 
but it also extends to speech that SMs make about military affairs. Should 
we construe a soldier’s comments on Army policies as being part of their 
official duty speech since they are the subject matter expert and all-the-
while on active duty status? Do the writings of a sailor regarding official 
Navy policy also carry the same presumption of being official duty speech 
if they are written on an online blog?66 When SMs deploy abroad, they are 
always on duty and face the added problem that using government 
computers is often the only way that they can communicate with friends 
and family members back home, thus the potential for their speech to fall 
within their official duties is even greater.67 
The question of status is a pervasive and important one since the status 
of an SM is the crucial determinant in deciding whether a military tribunal 
has jurisdiction over that person. Regulations like DoD 1344.1068 
explicitly incorporate and exclude certain SMs, and other military 
regulations apply only to active duty SMs and members of the National 
Guard that are serving on active duty status, excluding Guard members 
that remain under the control of their state governor. The Supreme Court 
has ruled on both sides of the status question and ultimately holds today 
that regardless of whether an SM commits a crime off-base, and even if 
their crime has absolutely no connection to their federal service, military 
courts still have jurisdiction over the SM because of their military status.69 
                                                      
 66. The application of the “official duty speech” test is particularly important in the area of 
blogging which has proliferated since web publishing tools were made either free or nearly so 
exceedingly cheap to non-journalists in the mid-1990’s. Military-related blogs to which military 
professionals regularly contribute are numerous and include both officially-sponsored online platforms 
such as The Army Times and many privately-run entities, leading to questions of when exactly an 
SM’s written content would fall under their official duty speech and thus be censorable. The Army 
Times is Congressionally-sponsored and has an office with established independent from political 
oversight (Office of the Ombudsman) and is intended as a publication to increase service morale. See, 
e.g., Top 60 Military Websites & Blogs for Military Professionals & Veterans, available at 
https://blog.feedspot.com/military_blogs/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2018). 
  67. While SMs are deployed overseas, they often have access to computers, which run on the 
Non-Secure Internet Protocol (NIPR) and provide access to the same websites that can be visited from 
privately-owned computers. See Satellite Communications: Snap, 
http://peoc3t.army.mil/wint/snap.php. The online activity of SMs is nonetheless still subjected to the 
requirements to maintain operational security and SMs are asked to refrain from posting otherwise 
unobtainable information on open-source webpages, including their social media sites. See also 
Operations Security, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. EDUC. ACTIVITY, 
http://www.dodea.edu/offices/safety/opsec.cfm. 
 68. See DOD DIR. 1344.10, supra note 2. 
 69. The decision in Solorio v. United States held that “the jurisdiction of a court-martial 
convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try a matter involving a 
member of the Armed Forces” does not “depen[d] on the ‘service connection’ of the offense charged.” 
483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). This overruled the earlier decision of the Court in O’Callahan v. Parker, 
395 U.S. 258 (1969), which held that the jurisdiction of a military tribunal was dependent on a nexus 
between the crime and the defendant’s service in the military, and to try SMs in military tribunals for 
civilian offenses would deprive them of the benefits of a grand jury indictment and jury trial. Id. at 
272–74. Prior to the holding in O’Callahan, a lengthy line of cases had established that SMs could be 
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Thus, regardless of whether an SM’s crime is related to their military 
service, they are considered on official active duty status at all times and 
places for the purposes of the First Amendment.  
IV. THE IMPACT UPON SERVICEMEMBER AUTONOMY AND THE 
TYRANNY OF MAJORITY OPINION 
The restrictions on political speech and the absence of clear guidance 
on acceptable speech are stunting SM autonomy and political self-
expression. This is a particularly dangerous trend since all SMs are drawn 
from the democratic society they work to safeguard, and if they fail to 
exercise their First Amendment rights, an entire segment of the American 
population is structurally disenfranchised from lending their voice to the 
larger political debate. This could only be an acceptable outcome if we are 
willing to accept that the highly attenuated connection between an overly-
politicized military and the current restrictions against political activity by 
SMs justifies their marginalization.  
Despite his copious writing on First Amendment issues, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes never directly addressed the issue of SM political 
expression, though it is likely that his jurisprudence would comprehend 
the elimination of SMs from the political sphere.70 In his work The 
Common Law, individual rights are conceptualized not as mere casualties 
of war, but also as the proper subject of ongoing revision and contraction 
in the civilian context: “[t]he most fundamental of the supposed 
preexisting rights—the right to life—is sacrificed without a scruple not 
only in war, but whenever the interest of society, that is, of the 
predominant power in the community, is thought to demand it.”71 It is thus 
difficult to square the jurisprudence of a man who, while treating the law 
as a mere instrument by which the dominant force in society maintains 
power, nonetheless upheld the idea that the Constitution can only tolerate 
restrictions on speech when there is an immediate danger threatened by 
such speech. 
When Holmes detailed the ‘clear and present danger’ test in Schenck, 
he would likely not have imagined the test being used as a basis to thwart 
                                                                                                                           
tried by military tribunals. Nonetheless, the overruling of O’Callahan by Solorio upholds the idea that 
the concept of status is the key factor in determining when a military tribunal can punish an SM for 
their speech and conduct. 
 70. For the argument that Holmes’ view of free speech is best understood as grounded in an 
argument that truth consists of choices made by majorities or dominant forces in society in response to 
challenges to the status quo, and that Holmes’ constitutional commitment to free speech was a way to 
safeguard the conditions for collective self-determination see Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and 
Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech 
Defenses, 22 YALE J. LAW & HUMANITIES 35 (2010). 
 71. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918). 
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the possibility of an overly-politicized military. Rather, Holmes described 
the law as the rules laid down by the dominant majority group in society, 
and he seemed to support the disregard of individuality if it furthered the 
country’s larger objectives. To that end, his view of humanity as a largely 
uninformed entity plunging forward through time echoes with military 
metaphors: we are like “private soldiers [that] have not been told the plan 
of campaign, or even that there is one, rather than some vaster unthinkable 
to which every predicate is an impertinence, has no bearing upon our 
conduct. We still shall fight.”72  
There is a further and perhaps more troubling trend fostered by this 
lopsided framework of political expression governing military members 
which continues to enjoy great popularity amongst military officers and 
the military community at large: that of the completely apolitical military 
which chooses to forego its civic duties rather than exercise what is 
currently available. In recent years, several military officers have put forth 
arguments that members of the military should not vote but should remain 
completely neutral with regards to partisan politics.73 This less-than-
friendly attitude towards civic duty in the spirit of not seeming too overtly 
partisan contributes to what John Stuart Mill feared in On Liberty, namely 
that the oppressive norms of the majority would work to stifle the dissent 
of the minority: “The likings and dislikings of society, or of some 
powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically 
determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties 
of law or opinion.”74  
In the modern discourse of military thinkers, the accepted mantra of 
political neutrality has been touted as an ideal to which military members, 
especially military officers, should strive to uphold, and this ideological 
position has even perhaps become a fashionable one for SMs that want to 
justify their civic non-participation. One active-duty army officer wrote in 
an editorial during the 2016 presidential election: “I strongly believe that 
officers, like all citizens, should have the right to vote. But because 
military officers have a special responsibility to prevent politics from 
dividing our troops and separating us from society, it is all the more 
                                                      
 72. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 71, at 43. Much of Holmes’s writing and personal outlook 
appear to have been heavily influenced by his experience fighting with the 6th Corps for the Union 
Army during the Civil War. When Franklin Roosevelt came to greet Holmes on the advent of his 
ninety-second birthday he asked him: 
Justice, you are the greatest living American. For half the history of the Republic you have 
seen its greatest events and known its greatest men. What is your advice to me?” Holmes 
replied, “You are in a war, Mr. President. I was in a war, too. And in a war there is only one 
rule: Form your battalions and fight. 
 LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL (1991).  
 73. See Toner, supra note 29; Cavanaugh, I Fight for Your Right, supra note 29. 
 74. MILL, supra note 3, at 17. 
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important for us to choose not to exercise that right.”75 On another popular 
privately-run military news site, another army officer acknowledged the 
powerful norms of apolitical behavior in military by writing that “[t]here is 
an unwritten code in our armed forces that those serving, especially 
officers, should not vote in U.S. elections.”76  
This viewpoint has been expressed in the New York Times and other 
mainstream media, and has also been written about and discussed in 
academic literature. As part of his Command and General Staff College 
thesis, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Toner authored a paper suggesting that 
there should be a professional norm of abstention from voting among the 
officer corps:77 
Military officers should not vote . . . This paper does not suggest a 
policy to restrict an officer’s right to vote. Rather, it suggests a 
professional norm that officers voluntarily abstain from voting in 
federal elections—elections for congress and the president. This 
treatment is limited to officers and federal elections because of the 
senior-subordinate relationships between military officers and 
elected and appointed political leaders.78 
In rather dire language and outlook, some military officers have also 
crafted dystopian works of fiction that predict a future American 
government dominated by a military regime that has overtaken the 
country. Dating from as far back as 1992 (perhaps coincidentally around 
the advent of retired generals and admirals sponsoring presidential 
candidates), these works attempt to describe the evident trends and 
conditions necessary for an eventual military takeover of the American 
government.79 Such an unlikely eventuality seems difficult to grasp but it 
                                                      
 75. See Cavanaugh, I Fight for Your Right, supra note 29. 
 76. Terron Sims, II, If You’re in the Military and Don’t Vote, You’re Neglecting Your Duty, 
TASK & PURPOSE, http://taskandpurpose.com/dont-vote-youre-military-youre-neglecting-duty/ (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2018). 
 77. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Toner suggests multiple reasons that as a professional norm (and 
not an official restriction or other imposed measure) officers should abstain from voting. Chief among 
these are (1) the role of the military officer as a neutral and not just non-partisan but ‘unpartisan’ 
figure is crucial to the public perception of officers as being blind to partisan consideration; (2) under 
‘Agency Theory’ where the principal is the civilian leader and the military officer is the agent, the 
existence of a moral hazard through ‘shirking’ that could be practiced by military officers when the 
interests of the military and civilian leadership are at odds (shirking taken to mean quashing policies 
that run counter to military interests through slow-rolling such policies are burying them in a 
bureaucratic morass); and finally (3) officers should not pick their bosses since they would effectively 
be picking the principals for whom they will serve as agents. See Toner, supra note 29. 
 78. Id.  
 79. The first of these, Charles R. Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the American Military Coup of 
2012, PARAMETERS, (Winter 2010-11), posits that such a possible future development might come 
about because of the military diversion to civilian uses, a monolithic unification of the Armed Forces 
under a single command, and the increasing insularity of the military community. The second work by 
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has nonetheless been batted about to an increasing extent on internet blogs 
and other political websites with various authors guessing at what would 
be necessary for a military coup to occur.80 To the extent that members of 
the Armed Forces identify with certain candidates or factions, recent 
research from the Harvard University Institute of Politics strongly suggests 
that the majority of military-age youths already in the military, or 
considering joining the military, support Republican candidates, and that a 
majority of that same demographic that have already joined are Hispanic.81 
The legal regulation of political expression in an already quasi-
homogenous segment of society is especially concerning because it 
reinforces existing cultural mores and political thinking. 
Because of the military’s hierarchical structure and culture, it is 
particularly susceptible to the oppression by majority opinion that Mill 
warned about. Every large group tends to adopt certain broad 
characteristics that come to define the group’s organizational culture, and 
the military is the host of a culture based upon necessary conformity.82 
This culture of conformity is further reinforced by legal norms, military 
law being “that of obedience”83 which, out of operational need, runs 
contrary to the liberty model that Mill formulated. While the speech that 
SMs are allowed to use is constrained by the values of efficiency, security, 
and political neutrality, the liberty model of free speech holds that humans 
must be able to speak freely if they are to achieve self-realization, because 
“[h]uman nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do 
                                                                                                                           
Matthew Cavanaugh, The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2037, MODERN WAR INSTITUTE 
AT WEST POINT (Nov. 28, 2017), https://mwi.usma.edu/origins-american-military-coup-2037/, 
reimagines the first work and places the origins of the coup within the erosion of the nonpartisan ethic 
in the officer corps and the open partisan political affiliation of officers. 
 80. Luke Foster Middup, Thinking the Unthinkable: Could There Be a Military Coup in the U.S?, 
THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 7, 2017), https://theconversation.com/thinking-the-unthinkable-could-
there-be-a-military-coup-in-the-us-82403. For further works in the popular press that discuss the 
increasingly disturbing trend of military exceptionalism, see Masha Gessen, John Kelly and the 
Language of the Military Coup, NEW YORKER (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/john-kelly-and-the-language-of-the-military-coup. 
 81. Paul Bedard, The Few: Republicans Join Military 2-to-1 over Democrats, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-few-republicans-join-military-2-to-1-over-
democrats/article/2578367. For the Harvard University Institute of Politics data on this issue, see 
Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes Toward Politics and Public Service (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/pictures/151208_Harvard%20IOP%20
Fall%202015%20Report.pdf.  
        82.   The military is a “specialized society separate from civilian society.” Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 743 (1974). Scholarly depictions of military free speech affirm: 
 [A] military organization is not constructed along democratic lines and military activities 
cannot be governed by democratic procedures. Military institutions are necessarily far more 
authoritarian; military decisions cannot be made by vote of the interested participants. . . . 
[T]he existence of the two systems [military and civilian does not] mean that constitutional 
safeguards, including the First Amendment, have no application at all within the military 
sphere. It only means that the rules must be somewhat different. 
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 57 (1970).  
 83. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890). 
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exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides.”84 To that end, Mill treated speech as more than 
a means to facilitate the accomplishment of certain goals but as a critical 
component of self-rule, the foundation of democratic government. 
In the military context, the combination of legal restrictions and the 
extra-legal expression of cultural norms that govern the political lives of 
SMs further separates them from the society on whose behalf they conduct 
the business of war. This disenfranchisement seems to reflect the idea that 
soldiers are vassals of the state that should not have the personal and 
political autonomy of full-fledged members of a democracy. Not only are 
members of the military prohibited from making explicit endorsements 
when a member of the public might be able to infer that the SM’s speech 
implies official endorsement, but the current environment encourages 
excess caution when espousing less-than-popular political or social views. 
One recent instance of an SM espousing unpopular views occurred in 
September 2017 when Spenser Rapone, a Second Lieutenant and graduate 
of the United States Military Academy, posted a photo of himself on his 
Instagram account with the message “Communism will win” inside of his 
cadet service cap and another of him in uniform wearing a Che Guevara 
shirt underneath his service dress.85 Lieutenant Rapone also posted a 
message criticizing the Secretary of Defense.86 The photos that Lieutenant 
Rapone posted online arguably do not run afoul of the UCMJ, unlike his 
comments demeaning the current Secretary of Defense.87 But what is more 
                                                      
       84. MILL, supra note 3, at 107. 
 85. Meghann Myers, West Point Responds to Tweet of Cadet with Che Guevara Tee under 
Uniform, ARMY TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/
2017/09/26/west-point-responds-to-tweets-of-cadet-with-che-guevara-tee-under-uniform/; Meghann 
Myers, Former West Point Cadet in Che Guevara Shirt Is an Afghanistan Combat Veteran, ARMY 
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/09/29/former-west-point-
cadet-in-che-guevara-shirt-is-an-afghanistan-combat-veteran-and-other-rumors-clarified/. The photos 
that Second Lieutenant Rapone posted were inflammatory enough to draw a response from the 
Superintendent of the United States Military Academy. See Letter from the Office of the 
Superintendent of the United States Military Academy (Oct. 11, 2017), available at 
http://www.usma.edu/news/Shared%20Documents/Superintendent%27s%20Le
tter%20to%20Graduates%20Regarding%202nd%20Lt.%20Rapone.pdf. In response to the 
Superintendent’s letter, a retired United States Military Academy professor issued a letter condemning 
the overall deterioration of the once-great culture of discipline and honor at the academy, highlighted 
by the recent scandal over Rapone’s photos. See Exclusive: Former West Point Professor’s Letter 
Exposes Corruption, Cheating and Failing Standards, AMERICAN MILITARY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2017/10/exclusive-former-west-point-professors-letter-exposes-
corruption-cheating-and-failing-standards-full-letter/. 
 86. Lieutenant Rapone violated Article 88 through his comments. Because Article 88 prohibits 
uniformed officers from using speech that demeans the commander-in-chief, vice-president, secretary 
of defense, and other senior officials, Rapone is subject to criminal violations of the UCMJ for his 
statements against Secretary of Defense James Mattis. 
 87. Article 88: Contempt toward officials: 
 Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice 
President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the 
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concerning is the outpouring of condemnation from current and retired 
members of the military as well as members of Congress.88 The lockstep 
criticism of Lieutenant Rapone’s unpopular minority views creates the 
inference that the expectation from members of the military is that they be 
of one opinion and do not dissent from the status quo. 
Perhaps in an ideal world, the military’s hierarchical culture and 
vibrant professional norms would carry the day and enforce an ethic of 
political non-partisanship without the need for regulations that govern SM 
political expression. But as currently written, and when enforced in our 
increasingly digitized world, restrictions on political expression trammel 
the personal autonomy and individual conscience that members of a 
democracy should otherwise be able to exercise, regardless of their status 
or class. This stifling of political expression from the segment of 
American society charged with maintaining our freedoms and fighting our 
wars leads to certain structural deficiencies in our political discourse that 
will likely be compounded over time. 
V. ABSENT VOICES FROM THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
The theory of the marketplace of ideas, which attempts to illustrate the 
role of free speech within a complex society such as ours, underpins what 
has been described as the “truth-seeking function” of the First 
Amendment.89 Justice Holmes, in a consequentialist vein, wrote that “the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market,” a hypothesis which is “the theory of our 
Constitution.”90 Although it might be disconcerting to see retired generals 
handing down endorsements to political candidates during election cycles, 
the contributions that current SMs make to political discourse provide a 
viewpoint that they are uniquely qualified to share.91 Such a marked 
absence creates a structural deficiency that cannot be easily overcome, 
especially in a culture as it currently exists in the United States where the 
                                                                                                                           
Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, 
Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct. 
 UCMJ art 88. 
 88. See Jared Keller, Marco Rubio’s War On This Communist West Point Grad May Blow Up In 
His Face, TASK & PURPOSE (Oct. 4, 2017), http://taskandpurpose.com/communist-west-point-army-
rubio/. 
 89. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 90. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).  
 91. See Corbett & Davidson, supra note 11. In their work on the role of the military in 
presidential politics, Professors Corbett and Davidson expressed great concern over the use of political 
endorsements by retired generals. High-ranking officers who have left the service are no longer subject 
to the UCMJ and as such are free to make political statements without the fear of legal reprisal. 
However, the focus here is on active and reserve SMs who, but for regulation of their political 
expression, might participate in partisan politics to a greater degree. 
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highest court in the land has “recognized that the military is, by necessity, 
a specialized society separate from civilian society” and thus the two 
groups of people exist in essentially different social spheres.92 
To the extent that Holmes believed in the marketplace of ideas 
approach to the First Amendment, he was remarkably comfortable with 
restricting or even eliminating the voices of individual segments of society 
so long as it was a restriction performed for the greater good.93 
Restrictions on speech during wartime that would be patently 
unconstitutional during peacetime find ready justification in Holmes’ 
opinion in Schenck: “[I]n ordinary times” the leaflet involved urging men 
preparing for World War I to resist the draft, would have received 
constitutional protection, but “[w]hen a nation is at war many things that 
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their 
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight.”94 Holmes’ personal 
correspondence affirmed his support for this vast expansion of government 
power during wartime though he was troubled by the short-circuiting of 
debate presented by the Espionage and Sedition Acts.95 This expansion of 
government powers to restrict speech during wartime was affirmed by a 
string of Supreme Court cases that came on the tail-end of WWI.96 But 
here again, Holmes’ writing displays a kind of inherent contradiction that 
marks his other opinions as evolving and constantly responding to the 
times. Holmes’ view that humanity is largely on an experimental journey 
which veers from right to left in pursuit of the correct, happy medium 
seems to dictate that the value of free speech is not so much that it 
preserves the personal autonomy and liberties of the individual, but that 
free speech is really most beneficial to the primary decision-makers in 
power by allowing them to test ideas, question accepted dogma, and 
govern more effectively. In dissent in Abrams v. United States, Holmes 
                                                      
 92. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). 
 93. See Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 71. 
 94. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  Later in his famous Abrams dissent, 
Holmes wrote: 
The United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce 
a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the 
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. The power undoubtedly is greater in time 
of war than in time of peace because war opens dangers that do not exist at other times. 
Abrams, v. 250 U.S. at 627. 
 95. In a personal letter to Harold J. Laski dated May 12, 1919, Holmes wrote: 
I think the clauses under consideration not only were constitutional but were proper enough 
while the war was on. When people are putting out all their energies in battle I don’t think it 
unreasonable to say we won’t have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising troops—
by persuasion any more than by force. But in the main I am for aeration of all effervescing 
convictions—there is no way so quick for letting them get flat. 
VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2012). 
 96. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck, 
249 U.S. at 47. 
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wrote that “[p]ersecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes 
in law and sweep away all opposition.”97 But despite this logical aim of 
proscribing certain kinds of speech, he also argued alongside that 
proposition that “we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the 
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country.”98 
How do we reconcile Holmes’ near-dismissive attitude toward the 
pursuit of truth in a democratic society as being a constant experiment and 
his insistence that we remain vigilant against attempts to quash expression 
of minority opinion? Much of what was commonly accepted as providing 
substance for “natural rights” Holmes considered to be constructs of a 
larger well of cultural thought: “for legal purposes a right is only the 
hypostasis of a prophecy—the imagination of a substance supporting the 
fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things 
said to contravene it.”99 To that end, what we one day think of as essential 
rights can be changed when the next generation conceives fundamental 
rights to encompass a different set of values, a key premise underlying his 
famous dissent in Lochner v. New York.100   
Holmes seemed to think that time would ultimately turn today’s 
orthodoxy into tomorrow’s heresy because our constitutional framework is 
just that: a framework to allow for experimentation within certain 
boundaries. To that end, he wrote in Abrams that, “when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct 
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trades in ideas.”101 
The answer to this inconsistency seems to lie in his belief that law is an 
expression of the dominant force in power, and as a constitutional 
democracy, our society has made the choice that decision-making power 
                                                      
   97. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
       98.   Id. 
       99. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 71. 
 100. Justice Holmes noted:  
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of 
others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered 
with by school laws, by the Post office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his 
money for purposes though to be desirable, whether he likes it or not. The 14th Amendment 
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statistics. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This conception of 
fundamental rights as a constantly shifting set of social that change when the dominant force in society 
perceives the change to be necessary is key to understanding how Holmes approaches restrictions of 
speech even on sensitive political issues.  
       101.   Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
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over military affairs ultimately resides in the populace that has placed 
decision-making authority in the Congress and the Executive branch in 
tandem. Both branches of the government have thus taken steps to restrict 
the ability of their subordinate military entities to influence and participate 
in the political process that ensures they maintain power, because to allow 
for a partisan-leaning military presents a clear and present danger to the 
current constitutional order. 
When Holmes formulated the Schenck opinion and gifted to us the 
stubbornly persistent image of the man “falsely shouting fire”102 in a 
crowded theater, he neglected one critical aspect that renders his metaphor 
as deficient as it is long-lasting. The man falsely shouting fire has no 
legitimate, constitutional interest in the speech that he wishes to make, and 
thus, there is essentially no balancing that a court is able to do when it 
applies that analogy in the context of what speech constitutes a clear and 
present danger.103 The SM who wishes to exercise the Constitutional right 
as an American citizen to critique, criticize, and choose elected leaders is 
not merely yelling fire into the crowded theater of cyberspace but 
exercising the very essence of what it means to be a citizen of a 
democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
While the current outer edges of permissible political speech available 
to SMs are very much open to debate, at least two external conditions are 
very likely to occur. First, given current social trends, the military as a 
distinct community is likely to become increasingly isolated from the 
society at large.104 Second, the use of social media and other forms of 
online political engagement by members of the military is only likely to 
increase.105 Because contradictions and inconsistencies persist in the way 
                                                      
 102. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).   
 103. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION (1988). Kalven criticized the Schenck test 
by noting that, “the man shouting ‘fire’ does not offer premises resembling those underlying radical 
political rhetoric—premises that constitute criticism of the government.” Id. The man shouting fire can 
claim no substantive right to make such an incitement because it provides no social utility. 
     104.   For an intriguing analysis of the increasing separation between military and civilian society 
by one of the military’s leading commentators and critics, see Thomas Ricks, The Widening Gap 
Between Military and Society, THE ATLANTIC (July 1997), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widening-gap-between-military-and-
society/306158/.  
 105. See Michelle Borgnino, Mutiny on the High C: How the Armed Forces Regulate and 
Criminalize Servicemember Speech Online, 224 MIL. L. REV. 800 (2016).  
[T]he average [junior-enlisted member] today does not remember a time when there was no 
Internet, no camera cell phone, and no text messaging. In that he/she is a ‘digital native.’ This 
means of communication is as natural to him/her as a letter home was to . . . previous 
generations. The status symbol today for the ‘wired generation’ is how many friends you have 
on your MySpace or Facebook page. 
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that courts treat the First Amendment rights of SMs, blurring the line 
between the clear and present danger to military order and discipline, and 
that which has an attenuated connection to an overtly political military, the 
migration of our political discourse to the digital world will compound the 
difficulty that we have in defining acceptable SM political expression. 
If the UCMJ is used to constrain SM political expression online, and 
DoD regulations leave the boundaries of acceptable SM political 
expression open to interpretation, then this small but important group of 
citizens will continue to be marginalized in undertaking their civic 
responsibilities while in uniform. Would it not be better to allow civic 
engagement from SMs who are engaged in the work of the military rather 
than wait for them to serve twenty or thirty years and then hand down the 
endorsement of a presidential candidate?  
 
                                                                                                                           
Id. at 806–07 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 462 (C.A.A.F. 
2008)). 
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